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Coverage Guided Differential Adversarial Testing of
Deep Learning Systems
Jianmin Guo, Yue Zhao, Houbing Song, and Yu Jiang

Abstract—Deep learning is increasingly applied to safetycritical application domains such as autonomous cars and
medical devices. It is of significant importance to ensure their
reliability and robustness. In this paper, we propose DLFuzz,
the coverage guided differential adversarial testing framework
to guide deep learing systems exposing incorrect behaviors.
DLFuzz keeps minutely mutating the input to maximize the
neuron coverage and the prediction difference between the
original input and the mutated input, without manual labeling
effort or cross-referencing oracles from other systems with the
same functionality. We also design multiple novel strategies for
neuron selection to improve the neuron coverage. The incorrect
behaviors obtained by DLFuzz are then exploited for retraining
and improving the dependability of the models.
We present empirical evaluations on two well-known datasets to demonstrate its effectiveness. Compared with DeepXplore,
the state-of-the-art deep learning white-box testing framework,
DLFuzz does not require extra efforts to find similar functional
deep learning systems for cross-referencing check. But DLFuzz
could generate 338.59% more adversarial inputs with 89.82%
smaller perturbations, while maintaining the identities of the
original inputs. DLFuzz also managed to averagely obtain 2.86%
higher neuron coverage, and save 20.11% time consumption
with respect to DeepXplore. We then evaluate the effectiveness
of strategies for neuron selection, and demonstrated that all
these strategies perform better than DeepXplore. Finally, DLFuzz
proved to be able to improve the accuracy of deep learning
systems by incorporating these adversarial inputs to retrain.
Index Terms—deep learning, dependability, adversarial testing,
neuron coverage.

I. I NTRODUCTION

D

EEP learning plays a key role in the development of
artificial intelligence. In the past few years, deep learning
has demonstrated its competitiveness on a wide range of applications, such as image classification [1], [2] in autonomous
cars, natural language processing [3] in robotics and even
reconstruction of brain circuits [4] in medical devices. These
encouraging accomplishments inspired wide deployments of
deep learning techniques in more security-critical domains,
and it is in great demand to test their dependability.
For the testing of deep learning systems, the classical
approach is to gather sufficient manually labeled input data
to assess the accuracy. However, the input space of testing
is so huge that it is extremely hard to collect all the possible
inputs to trigger every feasible logic of a deep learning system.
It is demonstrated that state-of-the-art deep learning systems
can be fooled by adding small perturbations to the test inputs
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Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084 China.
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[5]. Although deep learning exhibits impressive performance
on image classification or recognition tasks, the classifiers
can also be easily led to incorrect classifications by applying
imperceptible perturbations [6], as shown in Fig. 3. Therefore,
deep learning systems testing is quite challenging but essential
to ensure the correctness of those safety-critical practices.
Several approaches have been proposed to improve the
testing efficiency of deep learning systems with software
testing techniques. Some of them leverage solvers like Z3 to
generate adversarial inputs under the formalized constraints
of the deep learning models [7], [8]. These techniques are
accurate, but work in a heavy white-box manner and are
resource-consuming for constraint solving. Some black-box
methods exploit heuristic algorithms to mutate the inputs until
the adversarial inputs acquired [9]. These methods are timeconsuming and rely heavily on the manually supplied ground
truth labels. Other approaches of adversarial deep learning
focus on fooling the deep learning systems by applying
imperceptible perturbations to the inputs mostly in a gradientbased manner [5], [6]. They work efficiently but are shown to
have low neuron coverage [10].
Recently, DeepXplore [10] was presented as the state-ofthe-art white-box testing framework for deep learning systems
and first introduced the concept of neuron coverage as a testing
metric. It relies on three deep learning systems with similar
functionality to cross-check and finds adversarial inputs which
produce different labels among these systems. Given one
test input, DeepXplore maximizes the difference of labels of
tested three systems and value of a neuron selected to cover
jointly. It could generate adversarial inputs efficiently and
improve neuron coverage substantially with respect to random
testing methods. Nevertheless, cross-referencing suffers from
the scalability and difficulty of finding similar deep learning
systems.
Owing to the totally distinct internal structures of deep
neural networks (DNN) and software programs, there exists
a large gap between the testing of deep learning systems and
the testing of traditional software systems. More efforts are
needed for approaches which could better combine software
testing into deep learning testing. Fuzz testing [11]–[13] has
been recognized as one of the most effective methodologies
for vulnerability detection in software testing, demonstrated
by the huge amount of vulnerabilities caught. The core idea
is to generate random inputs to execute as many program
paths as possible so as to lead the program to expose violations and crashes. It can be seen that fuzz testing and
deep learning systems testing share similar goals of achieving
higher coverage as well as getting more exceptional behaviors.
Furthermore, multiple strategies for input mutation play a key
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part in generating high-quality inputs randomly. To achieve
higher coverage, it keeps the mutated inputs contributing to
the increase of coverage in a seed list. Inspired by the similar
goal and useful experience of fuzz testing for later mutation,
the way of combining its knowledge into the adversarial testing
of deep learning systems is worth practicing.
In this paper, we propose DLFuzz, a coverage guided differential adversarial testing framework. It aims to maximize the
neuron coverage and to generate more adversarial inputs for
a given deep learning system, without cross-referencing other
similar systems or manual labeling. First, DLFuzz iteratively
selects neurons worthy to activate for covering more logics,
where multiple strategies are designed based on our premier
work [14]. Next, DLFuzz mutates the test inputs by applying
minute perturbations to guide the deep learning system exposing incorrect behaviors. During the mutation process, DLFuzz
keeps the mutated inputs which contribute to a certain increase
of the neuron coverage for the subsequent fuzzing. Besides,
the minute perturbation is restricted to be invisible so that
the prediction results of the original input and the mutated
inputs should be the same. In this way, DLFuzz is able to
automatically identify the erroneous behaviors with differential
testing that an error is triggered when the prediction result of
the mutated input is not the same as the original input.
To evaluate the efficiency of DLFuzz, we conducted empirical studies on six deep learning systems trained on two
popular datasets, MNIST [15] and ImageNet [16]. The deep
learning model and the datasets are exactly the same as
those used by DeepXplore. Compared with DeepXplore, DLFuzz does not need extra efforts to collect similar functional
deep learning systems for cross-referencing label check, but
could generate 135% − 584.62% more adversarial inputs
with 79.56% − 96.77% smaller perturbation. In the different
settings, DLFuzz obtained 1.10% − 5.59% higher neuron coverage. Besides, DLFuzz achieved higher neuron coverage even
in all the configurations of activation threshold of DeepXplore.
For the time efficiency, it saves 20.11% time consumption
on average with one exceptional case on ImageNet costing
59.42% more than DeepXplore. For the practical concerns,
we carried out thorough evaluations of the configurations of
the parameters and recommended better choices of them. Next,
we evaluate the effectiveness of strategies for neuron selection,
and demonstrated that all these strategies perform better than
DeepXplore while the better strategies for each deep learning
system vary. Finally, DLFuzz exhibits its practical use for
steadily improving the deep learning systems by augmenting
the training dataset and retraining the model.
In summary, our work has the following main contributions:
1) We combine fuzz testing into the adversarial testing of
deep learning systems and propose the first coverage
guided differential fuzz testing framework, which provides a novel direction for the testing of deep learning
based systems.
2) We leverage differential testing to avoid manually checking effort and overcome the trouble of collecting similar
functional deep learning systems for cross-referencing.
3) We implement the proposed framework and conduct
comprehensive experiments to demonstrate its highly effectiveness in improving the dependability of deep learn-

ing systems, compared with DeepXplore. Moreover, the
code, testing dataset and experimental results are all
available at https://github.com/turned2670/DLFuzz.
II. R ELATED W ORK
We present the most closely related work of deep learning
testing and fuzzing testing. The former two parts provide two
different research directions for deep learning testing.
Adversarial deep learning. The robustness and reliability of
deep learning systems are the crucial factors for their largescale applications in the real world. However, an intriguing
property of deep learning systems was found out that a stateof-art DNN can be easily fooled by applying imperceptible
perturbations to the input image [5]. Since then, a large number
of methodologies have emerged in this field. The classical
approach FGSM [17] computes the adversarial perturbation
efficiently by one-step gradient ascent. Another classical approach JSMA [18] fools the deep learning system by modifying several pixels according to a saliency map recording
the input features. Many approaches extended these work
and developed multiple trends including iterative methods
[19], [20], nontargeted attacks and targeted attacks [6], [20],
black-box attacks [21], defenses against attacks [22], attacks
beyond the context of image classification [23], [24], etc. For
detailed information on more related work, we recommend
a comprehensive survey about adversarial attacks on deep
learning [25].
As discussed earlier, these approaches perform efficiently
in generating adversarial inputs for the deep learning systems
as well as obtaining minute perturbations [6]. However, they
expose a major weakness that they achieve low neuron coverage, similar to the coverage obtained using randomly selected
test inputs [10].
Testing and verification of deep learning systems. Inspired
by the achievements of software testing for ensuring the
robustness of traditional programs, researchers also tried to
apply these techniques to deep learning testing for ensuring the
robustness of deep learning systems. White-box verification
approaches aim to guarantee the safety of deep learning systems by formally checking the violations of safety properties.
The early approach [26] defines safety constraints for the
whole deep learning system and solves them by an SAT solver.
Later works [7], [8] attempt to improve the scalability of
these approaches within a finite scope. However, they still
have a long way to serving the real-world deep learning
systems. Black-box testing approaches [9], [27] search the
input vector space for modifications which could cause errors.
Even with salient regions limiting the search space relatively,
these methods are still too time-consuming.
Unlike the above methods, DeepXplore [10] was proposed
as the first white-box testing framework which could scale
well to large-scale deep learning systems. It introduced neuron
coverage as a metric similar to the code coverage in traditional
testing. Several other approaches [8], [28] have also proposed
multiple metrics of different granularity for deep learning
testing.
Fuzz testing of software. Fuzz testing is an advanced
methodology of vulnerability detection in software testing.
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Fig. 1: Architecture of DLFuzz for the differential adversarial testing of deep learning systems.

It is well-known for its highly effectiveness in discovering
vulnerabilities in real-world applications. Most of the public
vulnerabilities are reported by fuzz testing tools. AFL [11]
and Libfuzzer [29] are two fundamental fuzzing tools and
are widely deployed in security communities and academic
research. AFL tends to test the whole program while Libfuzzer
focuses on fuzzing specific functions. Their key features for
producing random inputs and choosing better seeds to increase
the coverage have been combined into deep learning testing
in this paper.
Other approaches have made attempts to improve fuzzing.
Coverage-based fuzzers [12], [13], [30] leverage the coverage
information to guide the mutating process for valuable seeds.
Mutation-based fuzzers [31], [32] concentrate on fuzzing the
complex formats using the input format model. Some tools
[33], [34] have exploited symbolic execution to generate the
real inputs for feasible paths satisfying the constraints. The
means of utilizing these successful experience of fuzzing in
deep learning testing may be worthy of exploration further.
III. DLF UZZ S YSTEM D ESIGN
A. DLFuzz Overview
The overall architecture of DLFuzz is depicted in Fig.
1. In this paper, we implement DLFuzz to work on image
classification based deep learning systems, a popular task in
deep artificial intelligence domains to demonstrate its feasibility and effectiveness. The adaptions in other tasks such
as speech recognition are straightforward and also follow the
same workflow in Fig. 1.
To specify, the whole test input set X is composed of images
to be classified and each input x is the one during testing.
The DNN is a particular convolutional neural network (CNN)
under test, such as VGG-16 [35]. The mutation algorithm
applies tiny perturbation to x and gets x0 , which is visibly
indistinguishable from x. If the mutated input x0 and the
original input x are both fed to the CNN but classified to be
of different class labels, we treat this as an incorrect behavior
and x0 to be one of the adversarial inputs. The inconsistent
classification results before and after mutation indicate that at
least one of them is wrong so that manually labeling effort is
not required here. In contrast, if the two are predicted of the
same class label by the CNN, x0 will continue to be mutated
by the mutation algorithm to test the CNN’s robustness. In

addition, a seed list is well maintained for each given input
x, keeping those intermediate mutated inputs which could
increase the neuron coverage and satisfy the limit for the
perturbation. These seeds are then added to the test input set
X, used for subsequent fuzzing and producing incremental
adversarial inputs.
B. Coverage Definitions
Neuron coverage. Based on the demonstration that covering
more neurons could potentially trigger more logics and more
erroneous behaviors [10], DLFuzz also leverages the concept
of neuron coverage. It refers to the percent of neurons of the
DNN which have been activated at least once during testing.
The formal definition is represented in equation (1). Given
a set of test inputs T = {x1 , x2 , ...} and all neurons of
the testing DNN N = {n1 , n2 , ...}, for a specific neuron
n ∈ N , its output value under a specific input x fed to
the DNN is denoted by out(n, x). Neuron n is regarded
as activated (covered) if there exists one such input x that
out(n, x) is larger than the set threshold t. Here the threshold
t should be customized when testing.
|{n|∃x ∈ T, out(n, x) > t}|
(1)
N C(T ) =
|N |
l2 distance. DLFuzz adopts l2 norm, one of the most frequently used norms, to measure the perturbations and restrict
the perturbations to be nearly imperceptible. Considering the
observation that the same minute perturbation may produce
varying degrees of impact when applied to different inputs,
we introduce a relative measurement denoted by l2 distance,
which is defined to be the ratio of the l2 norm of the
perturbation to the l2 norm of the corresponding test input.
Similar to [6], we also adopt the average l2 distance of the
whole test inputs computed as follows as an important metric.
1 X krk2
l2 dist. =
(2)
|T |
kxk2
x∈T

where T and x are the same as the definitions in equation (1),
r is the perturbation obtained by DLFuzz for x.
C. Guided Adversarial Input Search Algorithm
The guided adversarial search is the main component of
DLFuzz. It is completed by solving a joint optimization problem of both maximizing the neuron coverage and the number
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of incorrect behaviors. The core process of the mutation
algorithm is presented in Fig. 2. The algorithm contains three
key components to discuss in detail.
Input: input list ← unlabeled inputs for testing
dnn ← DNN under test
k ← top k labels different from the original label
m ← number of neurons to cover
λ ← hyperparameter for balancing the two goals
strategies ← strategies for neuron selection
cov tracker ← tracks the information of neurons
iter times ← iteration times for each seed
Output: set of adversarial inputs, neuron coverage
1: adversarial set = []
2: for i = 0 to len(input list) do
3:
x = input list[i] //the original input
4:
seed list = [x] //seeds for each input
5:
for xs in seed list do
6:
c, c topk = dnn.predict(xs )
7:
neurons = selection(dnn, cov tracker, strategies, m)
8:
obj = sum(c topk) - c + λ · sum(neurons)
9:
grads = ∂obj/∂xs //gradient obtained
10:
for iter = 0 to iter times do
11:
/*grads processed to get the perturbation for mutation*/
12:
perturbation = processing(grads)
13:
x0 = xs + perturbation //mutated input obtained
14:
c0 = dnn.predict(x0 ) //label after mutation
15:
update cov tracker //update coverage information
16:
l2 distance = distance(perturbation, x)
17:
if the coverage improved by x0 > 0.01/(i + 1) and
l2 distance < 0.02 then
18:
seed list.append(x0 )
19:
if c0 != c then
20:
adversarial set.append(x0 )
21:
break

Fig. 2: The overall process of the mutation algorithm
Objective definition. As discussed in Section I, the gradientbased adversarial deep learning outperforms the other approaches in several aspects, especially in time efficiency.
It finds perturbations by optimizing the input to maximize
the prediction error [5], which is opposite to optimizing the
weights to minimize the prediction error while training the
DNN. It is easy to implement by customizing the loss function
as our objective and maximizing the loss by gradient ascent.
The loss function of DLFuzz is defined as the following
equation (line 8 in Fig. 2), which is also the optimization
objective:
k
m
X
X
obj =
ci − c + λ ·
ni
(3)
i=0

i=0

where
Pk the objective consists of two parts. In the first part
i=0 ci − c, c is the original class label of the input,
ci (i = 0, ..., k) is one of the top k class labels with confidence
just lower than c (line 6 in Fig. 2). Maximizing the first
part guides the input to cross the decision boundary of the
original class and lie in the decision space of top k other
classes. Such modified inputs are
Pmmore likely to be classified
incorrectly. In the second part i=0 ni , ni is a target neuron
intended to activate. These neurons are selected considering
many strategies to improve the neuron coverage (line 7 in
Fig. 2). The hyperparameter λ is used for balancing the two
objectives.

Adversarial input search. The adversarial search reveals
the overall workflow of Fig. 2. When given a test input x,
DLFuzz maintains a seed list for keeping the intermediate
mutated inputs which contribute to the neuron coverage. At
first, the seed list only has one input which is exactly x.
Next, DLFuzz traverses each seed xs and obtains the elements
making up its optimization objective. Then, DLFuzz computes
the gradient direction for later mutation. In the mutation
process, DLFuzz iteratively applies the processed gradient as
the perturbation to xs and obtains the intermediate input x0 .
After each mutation, the intermediate class label c0 , coverage
information, l2 distance of x and x0 are acquired. If the neuron
coverage improved by x0 and the l2 distance are desired, x0
will be added into the seed list. Finally, if c0 is already different
from c, the mutation process for seed xs terminates and x0 will
be included in the set of adversarial inputs. Therefore, DLFuzz
is able to generate multiple adversarial inputs for a certain
original input and explore a new way to further improve the
neuron coverage.
For the iterative mutation process, it contains two steps.
First, various processing methods are available to generate perturbations when the gradients obtained, including just keeping
the sign [5], imitating the realistic situations [10], [36], etc.
These mutation strategies for the input are easy to be extended
to DLFuzz. Second, DLFuzz adopts l2 distance to measure
the perturbation so as to ensure the distance between x and
x0 is imperceptible. As for the conditions of seed keeping in
line 17, DLFuzz limits our desired distance to a relatively
small range (less than 0.02) to ensure the imperceptibility. As
the neuron coverage improvement of one input declines with
more inputs tested, the corresponding threshold for keeping
the seeds also decreases with the number of inputs tested.
Furthermore, we can increase the thresholds of seed keeping
to reserve more mutated inputs with greater distance.
Strategies for neuron selection. To maximize the neuron
coverage, we propose four heuristic strategies for selecting
neurons more likely to improve coverage based on our premier
work [14], as below:
1) Strategy 1. Select neurons covered frequently during past
testing. Inspired by the practical experience in traditional
software testing that code fragments often or rarely
executed are more possible to introduce defects. Neurons
covered often or rarely perhaps can result in unusual
logics and activate more neurons.
2) Strategy 2. Select neurons covered rarely during past
testing due to the considerations stated above.
3) Strategy 3. Select neurons with top weights. It is presented based on our assumption that neurons with top
weights may have a larger influence on other neurons.
4) Strategy 4. Select neurons near the activation threshold.
It is easier to accelerate if activating/deactivating neurons with output value slightly smaller/larger than the
threshold.
For each seed xs , m neurons will be selected utilizing one or
more strategies, which can be customized in strategies of the
algorithm inputs of Fig. 2.
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IV. E XPERIMENT
A. Experiment Setup
Implementation. We implemented DLFuzz based on various
widespread frameworks of deep learning systems, Tensorflow
1.2.1, Keras 2.1.3 and Caffe 1.0.0. DLFuzz exhibits high
portability on these general frameworks. We developed and
evaluated DLFuzz on a computer with 4 cores (Intel i77700HQ @3.6GHz), 16GB of memory, an NVIDIA GTX
1070 GPU and Ubuntu 16.04.4 as the host OS.
Models and data sets. DLFuzz mainly tests CNN models of
classification tasks, similar to mainstream adversarial testing
frameworks. For evaluation, we selected two datasets used
by DeepXplore for image classification tasks, MNIST and
ImageNet. The same as DeepXplore, DLFuzz tested the three
identical pre-trained CNNs for each dataset.
MNIST [15]: a large database of handwritten digits consisting of 60000 training images and 10000 testing images. The
three pre-trained neural networks are the open-source CNNs
constructed by DeepXplore based on the LeNet family [37],
namely, LeNet-1, LeNet-4, LeNet-5.
ImageNet [16]: a large visual database containing over 14
million images for object recognition. The three pre-trained
CNNs to evaluate are VGG-16 [35], VGG-19 [35], ResNet50
[2], which are well-known for their remarkable performance.
Considering the fairness, we also randomly choose 20
images from the dataset for each CNN as test inputs in
the same way with DeepXplore. If not specified, the default
settings of hyperparameters k, m, λ, strategies and neuron
activation threshold t are 4, 10, 1, “Strategy 1” and 0.25
respectively. Hyperparameter iter times is 3 for ImageNet
and 5 for MNIST. The results of DeepXplore are obtained
under its recommended setting.
Research questions. We constructed the experiments to answer the following three research questions to demonstrate the
efficiency of our approach.
1) RQ1. How is the effectiveness of DLFuzz approach?
(Section IV-B)
2) RQ2. How is the effectiveness of strategies for neuron
selection? (Section IV-C)
3) RQ3. Is DLFuzz helpful for improving the deep learning systems? (Section IV-D)
B. RQ1: Effectiveness of DLFuzz.
Table I presents the effectiveness of DLFuzz compared with
DeepXplore. DLFuzz exhibits its advantages in improving the
neuron coverage, generating more adversarial inputs within the
same time limit and restricting imperceptible perturbations.
Higher neuron coverage. As presented in the fifth column
of Table I, for the tested six CNNs, DLFuzz achieved 1.10%
to 5.59% higher neuron coverage than DeepXplore under
different settings on average, including different neuron selection strategies applied and different activation thresholds for
computing the neuron coverage. For the best setting, DLFuzz
is able to acquire 13.42% higher neuron coverage.
As for the improvement of neuron coverage by DLFuzz,
the main reasons lie in two aspects. First, DLFuzz selects
more neurons with various strategies to cover specific decision

logics, whereas DeepXplore randomly selects one neuron to
cover, which is inadequate to improve the coverage. Next,
DLFuzz maintains a seed list to keep the intermediate mutated
inputs which could increase the neuron coverage during testing, which are used for subsequent testing to further improve
the coverage.
More adversarial inputs. DLFuzz averagely generated
338.59% more adversarial inputs, which could be extracted
from the eighth column of Table I. Several samples of adversarial inputs obtained by DeepXplore and DLFuzz for the same
inputs are given in Fig. 3. Note that, DLFuzz is effective to
produce adversarial inputs for any class, no matter how many
classes the tested model has. Because, it is easy for DLFuzz
to guide the model to classify inputs as other classes, with no
relevance to number of classes.
Since DeepXplore applies three types of domain-specific
constraints to the input image, namely different intensities of
lights, occlusion by a single small rectangle and occlusion by
multiple tiny black rectangles, one sample for each type of
the constraints is listed for MNIST except the third type for
ImageNet (not acquired after several times of testing). The
third sample for ImageNet is substituted by another sample of
the second type.
However, adversarial inputs under the third constraint for
MNIST are easily acquired. Similar to the third sample of
DeepXplore for MNIST, there are a few cases that the tiny
black rectangles applied overlap the key features of the inputs
and more tiny rectangles could even cover one part of the
inputs and change their labels. This type of realistic transformations is only applicable to cross-referencing frameworks
and hard to ensure the identity after being applied to the input.
Although the adversarial inputs should be acquired after more
experiments for ImageNet, it can be inferred that it’s harder
to generate adversarial inputs for larger-size colorful images
than smaller-size grayscale images by putting on multiple tiny
black rectangles.
Moreover, like the samples of DeepXplore in the first row of
Fig. 3, lighting effects added to the inputs to obtain adversarial
inputs are always stronger than in realistic conditions. In the
set of adversarial inputs generated by DeepXplore under the
first constraint, 60% and 25% of them are totally black or
white for ImageNet and MNIST respectively. In our opinions,
realistic transformations are valuable but more exploration is
needed for transformations like the second constraint, which
are always realistic and appropriate to obtain perturbations.
Smaller perturbations. Adversarial inputs generated by
DLFuzz have 89.82% smaller perturbations, derived from the
eleventh column of Table I. In this way, DLFuzz provides a
stronger guarantee for the consistence of the image’s identity
before and after mutation. As the samples in Fig. 3, the perturbations generated by DeepXplore are visible, whereas those
generated by DLFuzz are imperceptible and require careful
observations to identify. Thus, the visualized perturbation is
given for each sample of DLFuzz. As samples for MNIST
are nearly 8 times smaller than samples for ImageNet, the
alignment in Fig. 3 zooms in the samples for MNIST and
magnifies their perturbations.
Higher time efficiency. Finally, DLFuzz spent 20.11%
shorter time on generating each adversarial input on these
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TABLE I: Effectiveness of DLFuzz compared with DeepXplore, presented with the results of DeepXplore (DX.), DLFuzz (DF.)
and the improvement of DLFuzz w.r.t DeepXplore.
NC.1
# Adv.2
l2 dist.
Time per adv.3
DX.
DF.
Improved DX. DF. Increased
DX.
DF.
Decreased
DX.
DF.
Saved
LeNet-1
51.45% 53.90%
2.45%
20
53
165.00%
8.2637 0.2708
96.72%
0.7078
0.5623
20.56%
MNIST
LeNet-4
61.50% 67.09%
5.59%
20
47
135.00%
8.2637 0.2812
96.60%
0.7078
0.6344
10.37%
LeNet-5
63.30% 65.53%
2.23%
20
54
170.00%
8.2637
0.267
96.77%
0.7078
0.587
17.07%
VGG16
39.68% 43.19%
3.52%
13
89
584.62%
0.0817 0.0167
79.56%
10.473
3.4537
67.02%
ImageNet
VGG19
38.43% 40.71%
2.28%
13
81
523.08%
0.0817 0.0154
81.15%
10.473
3.6606
65.05%
ResNet50 56.00% 57.10%
1.10%
13
72
453.85%
0.0817
0.010
88.13%
10.473 16.6958 -59.42%
1 Neuron coverage. Achieving higher neuron coverage means that it’s able to test more logics of the deep learning system.
2 The number of the adversarial inputs. More adversarial inputs could augment the training set and further be used for improving the accuracy of the model.
3 Time for each adversarial input. Shorter time used indicates the higher efficiency.
DataSet

CNN

Ori.: 4

DX.: 8

DF.: 7

Ori.: rule

DX.: harmonica

DF.: harmonica

Ori.: 1

DX.: 7

DF.: 7

Ori.: robin

DX.: partridge

DF.: quail

Ori.: 9

DX.: 4

DF.: 7

Ori.: Bedlington

DX.: teddy

DF.: miniature poodle

Fig. 3: Samples of adversarial inputs annotated with the framework and the predicted label. (Ori. is the original label. Each
sample of DLFuzz also follows with its corresponding perturbation). The left four columns for MNIST and the right four
columns for ImageNet.
DLFuzz
DeepXplore

0.0

0.25

0.5

Neuron activation threshold t

MNIST

0.75

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

DLFuzz
DeepXplore

Neuron coverage (%)

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Neuron coverage (%)

deep learning systems, computed from the last column of
Table I. An exceptional case is that DLFuzz cost more time in
generating adversarial inputs than DeepXplore for ResNet50,
which is owing to more time needed for neuron selection when
testing a deep learning system consisting of a huge number of
neurons (94056).
Moreover, as in twelfth and thirteenth columns in Table
I, generating per adversarial input for models of ImageNet
costs more time than models of MNIST. This is due to higher
complexity of models of ImageNet. But, DLFuzz could still
reduce the time spent on VGG models around 65%.
Neuron coverage with different activation thresholds. As
illustrated in equation (1), the value of neuron coverage varies
with the activation threshold customized. Fig. 4 presents the
neuron coverage of DeepXplore and DLFuzz with different
activation thresholds for the two datasets. DLFuzz averagely
achieved 3.42% and 3.13% higher neuron coverage than DeepXplore for MNIST and ImageNet respectively under these
thresholds.
Hyperparameters for configuration. As for the hyperparameters configured in the input, we tried combinations of possible settings to evaluate their influence. Table II, III, and IV
reveal the variations in the effectiveness of DLFuzz with three
main hyperparameters m, k, λ in equation (3), respectively. In
Table III and IV, the number of neurons selected m is 8 and

0.0

0.25

0.5

Neuron activation threshold t

0.75

ImageNet

Fig. 4: The neuron coverage improvement with different
activation thresholds. The four thresholds are the exact values
in the evaluation of DeepXplore.
all the strategies are used together. The four main metrics are
still utilized for measuring the effectiveness, different from
just time efficiency evaluated in DeepXplore. For simplicity,
results for several CNNs are given.
According to the experimental results, the optimal value for
m is 5 among these deep learning systems and 30 is another
good choice for LeNet-4 and LeNet-5. Selecting more neurons
would gain no improvement in the neuron coverage and obtain
fewer adversarial inputs. Here, more neurons selected will
decentralize the value increasement of each neuron, as well as
the weight of the part searching for adversarial inputs. Then,
k = 1 and k = 9 both perform better on these CNNs and
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k = 3 is also a good choice for CNNs on MNIST. λ = 0.1
is optimal for LeNet-5, VGG-16 and VGG-19 while λ = 5 is
optimal for LeNet-4. But the changes of λ have little influence
on the effectiveness of DLFuzz on LeNet-1 and ResNet50.
Table V provides the results of DLFuzz with changes
of hyperparameter iter times (Line 10 in Fig. 2). The
parameter iter times also has a key impact on the success
rate of generating adversarial inputs given a set of test
inputs. The larger iter times is, the success rate tends to
be higher, as well as the neuron coverage and the number
of adversarial inputs. But more iteration times of mutating
would result in larger perturbations. The optimal value
for iter times of DLFuzz is 10 for MNIST and 30 for
ImageNet, whereas 50 is the default value of DeepXplore.
The answer to RQ1: DLFuzz is an effective approach for
deep learning testing. It could averagely achieve 2.86%
higher neuron coverage, generate 338.59% more adversarial
inputs with 89.82% smaller perturbations, and save 20.11%
time consumption.
TABLE II: The variation in the effectiveness of DLFuzz
on VGG-19 with different numbers of neurons selected to
activate (parameter m in equation (3)). The best result across
each column is highlighted in bold. (the same in the following
tables).
m
5
8
10
20
30
40
DX.

NC.
45.3%
43.7%
43.6%
42.3%
42.2%
43.4%
38.6%

# Adv.
36
28
23
14
12
22
15

l2 dist.
0.0146
0.0147
0.0160
0.0152
0.0169
0.0177
0.1478

Time per adv.
2.8626
3.7750
3.9238
7.2600
10.4903
5.8395
6.5717

TABLE IV: The variation in the effectiveness of DLFuzz
with the hyperparameter balancing the neuron coverage and
adversarial inputs generating (parameter λ in equation (3)).
The threshold t to compute NC. for LeNet-4 is 0.75.
CNN

LeNet-4

VGG-19

λ
0.1
0.5
1
5
10
DX.
0.1
0.5
1
5
10
DX.

l2 dist.

# Adv.

CNN
VGG-16
VGG-19

Time per adv.

1
70.9%*
66
0.2492
0.1989
3
70.5%
57
0.2592
0.2705
LeNet-5
4
70.5%
49
0.2683
0.3347
9
71.3%
55
0.2636*
0.4316
DX.
69.8%
20
8.4853
0.4132
1
50.3%
68
0.03
1.9574
3
47.2%
20
0.0175
2.9308
VGG-16
4
48.3%
32
0.0194
2.5996
9
49.9%*
63*
0.0263
2.6021
DX.
42%
15
0.1478
6.5717
* The second largest value across the corresponding column.

DLFuzz strategy 1
DLFuzz strategy 2
DLFuzz strategy 3
DLFuzz strategy 4
DeepXplore
0

4

8

12

16

Number of Images Tested

LeNet-4

19

60
54
48
42
36
30
24
18
12
6
0

Neuron Coverage (%)

Neuron Coverage (%)

70
63
56
49
42
35
28
21
14
7
0

LeNet-1
LeNet-4

4

8

12

16

Number of Images Tested

VGG16

Strategies
13
1
2
134
(with Strategy 4)
123
23
1234
124

NC.
50.0%
44.9%
74.5%
74.4%
36.5%
43.9%
43.9%
36.6%
36.6%

# Adv.
70
43
50
55
49
45
44
50
51

C. RQ2: Effectiveness of Strategies for Neuron Selection.

DLFuzz strategy 1
DLFuzz strategy 2
DLFuzz strategy 3
DLFuzz strategy 4
DeepXplore
0

Time per adv.
0.3588
0.3539
0.3454
0.4226
0.4663
0.4427
2.7917
3.7126
4.6690
6.4588
7.8549
6.5717

iters
success rate1
NC.
# Adv. l2 dist. Time per adv.
3
0.6
74.3%
40
0.0106
8.6322
5
0.75
74.6%
75
0.0137
6.0317
10
0.9
74.9%
165
0.0190
4.8113
20
1
75.2%
346
0.0275
4.0486
30
1
75.4%
600
0.0359
3.9829
50
0.95
75.6%
943
0.0465
4.1807
1 The percent of test inputs which could be mutated to be adversarial inputs.

LeNet-5
NC.

l2 dist.
0.2853
0.2838
0.2848
0.2941
0.2958
8.5498
0.0200
0.0251
0.0231
0.0251
0.0252
0.1478

TABLE VI: Better strategies for each CNN. The number of
neurons selected m is 8. The hyperparameter λ is 0.1. The
threshold t to compute NC. for LeNet models is 0.75.

TABLE III: The variation in the effectiveness of DLFuzz with
different numbers of top other labels (parameter k in equation
(3)).
k

# Adv.
42
43
44
34
31
20
34
27
20
13
10
15

TABLE V: The variation in the effectiveness of DLFuzz on
ResNet50 with the maximum iteration times when mutating
the seeds (parameter iter times in Line 10 of Fig. 2).

Resnet50

CNN

NC.
43.9%
43.9%
43.2%
45.3%
44.6%
34.5%
43.9%
43.8%
42.9%
42.7%
42.1%
38.6%

19

Fig. 5: Neuron coverage with the number of images tested
when different strategies applied in DLFuzz.

We tried the four proposed strategies for neuron selection on
two CNNs and depicted the results in Fig. 5. All strategies are
shown to contribute more to the neuron coverage improvement
than DeepXplore while having similar performance among
themselves. It seems that strategy 1 performs slightly better.
Besides, DLFuzz is able to achieve higher neuron coverage in
the early stage.
These strategies can also be combined together and Table
VI lists the better strategies for each CNN with NC. and #
Adv. as metrics, since the other metrics vary little among these
strategies. We have experimented over all the combinations
of the four strategies on each model. For instance, ”strategy
13” represents that strategy 1 and 3 are combined to select
neurons to cover, the same with other cases. For LeNet-1,
combinations with strategy 4 all perform well. As shown in
Table VI, the better strategies for each CNN are not common,
so various strategies designed provide the higher possibility
for maximizing the neuron coverage.
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Fig. 6: The accuracy improvement of three CNNs on MNIST after retraining.
The answer to RQ2: The neuron selection strategies we
designed are effective. All the neuron selection strategies
perform better than DeepXplore while the better strategies
for each deep learning system vary.
D. RQ3: Improving deep learning Systems by DLFuzz.
To prove the practical use of DLFuzz, we incorporated 114
adversarial images into the training set of three CNNs on
MNIST and retrained them to see if their accuracy is able
to increase. Note that it is hard to improve their accuracy as
their accuracy is already around 98% and those adversarial
images take up a tiny part with respect to the whole 60000
training images. Finally, we improved their accuracy by up to
1.8% within 5 epochs. More improvement is expected if more
adversarial inputs included in the retraining process. In this
way, these adversarial inputs generated by DLFuzz augmented
the training dataset with more corner cases and could improve
the robustness of the deep learning systems.
The answer to RQ3: DLFuzz exhibits its practical use for
improving the deep learning systems. By augmenting the
training dataset and retraining the deep learning systems,
DLFuzz could improve their accuracy by up to 1.8% within
5 epochs.
E. Discussion
Applicability of fuzzing to deep learning testing. The
effectiveness of DLFuzz demonstrates that applying the knowledge of fuzzing to deep learning testing is feasible and can
greatly improve the performance of existing deep learning
testing techniques such as DeepXplore. The gradient-based
solution of the optimization problem guarantees the easy
deployment and high efficiency of the framework. The mechanism of seed maintenance provides diverse directions and
larger space for improving the neuron coverage. Besides,
DLFuzz is capable to obtain incremental adversarial inputs
for one input. Various strategies combined for neuron selection
proved to be good at finding neurons beneficial for increasing
the neuron coverage.
Without manual effort. For confirmation, we checked
all the 366 adversarial inputs generated by DLFuzz, though
DLFuzz maintains quite small l2 distance by the restricted
threshold. We haven’t found any adversarial inputs that have
already changed their identities after mutation. The adversarial

inputs are nearly the same as the original input, and the
perturbations are imperceptible.
Advances over networking systems. Although DLFuzz
currently aims at image classification tasks, which are almost
CNN models involved, DLFuzz is designed with scalability
to be applied to other tasks and systems. For the advances of
our approach to be used over networking systems, they could
be summarized as twofold. First, CNN is now widely used in
many networking systems, always as necessary components
playing artificial tasks, like video processing component in
large-scale video storage networking system. Second, CNN
is also a special networking system, depending on connected
layers and neurons to process huge information. Thus, the advances of our method over CNN are potential to be generalized
to common networking systems.
Future work. Encouraged by the impressive effects of
DLFuzz on image classification tasks, we will work on the deployments of DLFuzz on other popular tasks in deep learning
domains, such as speech recognition. The specific constraints
for input mutation of the corresponding task will be added into
the common workflow. Also, some domain knowledge can be
leveraged to provide more efficient mutation operations and
increase the efficiency of DLFuzz.
V. C ONCLUSION
We design and implement DLFuzz as an effective coverage
guided adversarial testing framework of deep learning systems.
DLFuzz first combines the basic ideas of fuzz testing into deep
learning testing and demonstrates its effectiveness. Compared
with DeepXplore, DLFuzz averagely obtained 2.86% higher
neuron coverage and generated 338.59% more adversarial
inputs with 89.82% smaller perturbations given the same
amount of inputs. DLFuzz also overcomes the trouble of
relying on multiple deep learning systems of the similar
functionality in DeepXplore. The novel strategies designed by
DLFuzz for neuron selection perform well in improving the
neuron coverage. Additionally, DLFuzz exhibits its practical
use by incorporating these adversarial inputs to retrain the deep
learning systems and to steadily improve their accuracy.
Currently, DLFuzz is evaluated for CNN models and image
classification tasks. Since the scalability of its design, our
future work mainly includes the generalization over RNN
models and corresponding domains, like speech recognition
and natural language processing. Finally, our framework will
try to provide solutions for common networking systems.
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